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RECENT DECISIONS
Since the murderer was entitled to half of the joint property before the
killing, he could retain the benfits of this interest. However, the doctrine
that a man cannot benefit by his own wrong prevents the murderer from
acquiring not only the victim's half-interest, but also the victim's sur-
vivorship right. This view differs from the instant case because there is
no division of the joint property into inheritable interests; the victim's
estate inherits all of the property.36
It is submitted that the Montana court adopted a solution which
compromises conflicting considerations raised by the murder and suicide
of joint owners.37 On the one hand, the murderer is not permitted to
benefit his estate by acquiring the victim's half-interest. On the other,
the victim's estate is not deprived of property by the enforcement of the
murderer's survivorship right. In addition, the decision does not punish
the murderer's innocent heirs by denying their right to inherit all of the
joint property, but pragmatically states that justice and fairness are best
served by allowing the victim's heirs to take half of the joint property.38
JOSEPH E. REBER
DETERMINATION OF INSANITY-OLD PROBLEM REQUIRES A NEW AP-
rROACH.-In 1962 the defendant shot his wife and another woman, killing
his wife. Upon an information for first degree murder, he pleaded the
defense of insanity. The plea was based upon two grounds: (1) a history
of serious mental illness which dated from 1944; and (2) that the alleged
crime was the result of mental illness inasmuch as the defendant was
suffering from the delusion that his wife and the other woman were
carrying on illicit relations. The jury, under instructions from the court,
pronounced the accused legally sane at the time of the act and convicted
him. On appeal by the defendant to the Montana Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. The instructions of the trial court containing the right-wrong
and irresistible impulse tests presented the jury with the correct stand-
ard for determining insanity. State v. Noble, 384 P.2d 504 (Mont. 1963).
(A dissent by Mr. Justice Doyle condemned these tests as being out-
dated.)
Although a perfect test for insanity may never be developed, both
society and the courts have struggled to establish an adequate standard
to separate "criminals" from persons who are mentally irresponsible for
37Where a murderer does not commit suicide, the Montana court may be asked to
impose a constructive trust on all of the joint property, and permit the murderer to
retain only a life-interest in his half. The reasoning of the instant case would not
support this solution. It recognizes that a murderer cannot benefit by his felonious
act and thereby acquire the deceased's share of the property held jointly. This
benefit entails only the ''half-interest" of the victim, and does not entend to the
victim's survivorship right.
-In the absence of clear proof of which tenant died first it is unrealistic to enforce
the survivorship right. The facts of the instant case indicate that there was a
nominal time gap between the murder and the suicide. A lapse of several minutes
should not result in exclusive heirship. Under such circumstances the same result
could have been reached in the instant case by presuming that the deaths were
simultaneous. As provided in R.C.M. 1947, § 91-425, the joint property would descend
to the heirs of the respective tenants.
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their acts. The following four rules constitute the more significant stand-
ards which have been developed to test legal sanity:
(1) The M'Naghten or right-wrong test.1 A person is legally insane
if at the time he commits the particular act he does not know
the nature and quality of that act; or if he does, cannot dis-
tinguish whether it was right or wrong.-
(2) The irresistible impulse test. A person is relieved of criminal re-
sponsibility even though he knows his act to be wrong, if he is
able to prove that, at the time of the act, he could not choose
the right being compelled by an "irresistible impulse" to do the
wrong. 3
(3) The Durham Rule. A person is pronounced legally insane if the
act committed is a "product" of a mental disease or defect.4
(4) The Currens test. A person is declared legally insane if, at the
time the act was committed, he lacks substantial capacity due
to a mental disease or defect, to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. 5
The diagnosis of mental illness is exceedingly complex. However,
since the determination of insanity is a jury function, an adequate test
must serve not only as a guide so that, as far as possible, the exact con-
dition of the accused's mind is exposed, but also must be simple enough
for the jury to utilize. This conflict between the simple and complex
cannot be resolved without criticism of old rules and development of new.
The criticisms presented below serve to illustrate the problems involved
in the formulation of an adequate standard.6
Of the four rules mentioned, the M'Naghten rule, on its face, pre-
sents the simplest test of insanity. However, its application by a jury
may lead to confusion. Usually, as in the instant case, the preponder-
'This test became firmly established in England by the decision of the M'Naghten
case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
2The M'Naghten rule has become the sole test for insanity in the majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions, approximately thirty states accepting it. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
1447, 1452 (1956).
'The irresistible impulse test is seldom used by itself, but has been adopted as a
supplement to the right-wrong standard in fourteen states, this being the minority
rule in the United States. Although the irresistible impulse standard, if used as a
supplement to the right-wrong test, would seem to offer a more inclusive test for
determining insanity, there is no general trend toward its adoption, and it has been
rejected by several states in recent cases. Id., 1453-54.
'Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
'United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3rd Cir. 1961). The Currens test is
strikingly similar to, and for the most part has been adopted from the American
Law Institute test which states:
''1. A person is not responsible for the criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
''2. The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
OIt should be noted that the criticisms presented in this article are designed to pri-
marily consider the four rules from the standpoint of the jury's reaction. Criticisms
based upon the reaction of judges, lawyers, or psychiatrists will not be considered
by this article.
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ance of evidence relevant to the issue of insanity, pertains to the indi-
vidual's history of mental illness. Yet an instruction couched in terms
of the M'Naghten rule confines the jury to a consideration of the de-
fendant's ability to know right from wrong at the time of the act. If the
accused can distinguish, the jury must conclude that he is sane. Realis-
tically then, either the jury gives the person's past history of mental
illness little weight, or must, of necessity, disregard the instructions com-
pletely and view the total mental picture exposed by the evidence pre-
sented.
Furthermore, the right-wrong test, by making no reference to the
volitional or emotional functions of the mind, implies that no regard
is to be given these capacities when making a determination of insanity.
Thus, by adhering to the instruction, the jury could disregard serious
defects of the defendant's volitional or emotional faculties, and declare
the person sane because he intellectually realized right from wrong.7
For this reason, there is a real question whether the M'Naghten rule does
aid in separating the "criminal" from those who are mentally irresponsible
for their acts. The emphasis of the rule should only be considered as
one element in the jury's determination of the sanity question. However,
in spite of these criticisms, the simple terminology used in the right-
wrong test renders it fairly understandable to a lay jury.
Because of the failure of the M'Naghten rule to consider the element
of control at the time of the act, several courts have supplemented the
rule with the irresistible impulse test. By this combined test, although
the accused knows his act to be wrong, he may still be adjudged insane
if he was unable, because of impulse, to choose the right. The major
emphasis, as with the M'Naghten rule alone, is placed upon circumstances
surrounding the commission of the act, and little weight seems to be given
to an individual's history of mental illness, or the over-all picture of the
mind. The jury could still convict the defendant without denying the
existence of mental illness which may have been associated with the
criminal conduct.
Due to the terminology used in the irresistible impulse test, it is
further quite possible that a jury will interpret impulse to mean an act
motivated only by a spontaneous urge." However, a person may also lose
the ability to control his actions because of brooding and reflection. While
the courts no doubt would agree with this supposition, inadequate in-
structions may cause the jury to overlook uncontrolled actions caused
by the "slow burn."9
Both the Durham and Currens rules are attempts to present to the
jury the total mental condition of the accused rather than confining that
body to a determination based on the defendant's ability to know or
choose. 10 By directing the attention of the jury to the defendant's whole
'Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cm. L. R.v. 325, 326
(1955).
8See note 4 supra.
'The court in the instant case avoided the problem of interpreting "irresistible im-
pulse" because the term was not used in the instructions. Instant case at 508.
'
0Durhain v. United States, note 4 supra at 875, 876. See also United States v. Currens,
note 5 supra at 772.
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personality, both tests resulted in expanding the jury's discretion in
deciding the ultimate question of insanity.11 Although the two tests are
similar in these respects, the emphasis of each is considerably different.
The emphasis of the Durham test is placed upon the causal connec-
tion between the mental illness and the act. 12 The jury must determine
whether the act was the "product" of the mental disease. No real defi-
nition of the term "product" has been given although one case has stated
that the facts must justify the inference that the act would not have
occurred if it were not for the illness.' 3 As interpreted, the Durham rule
seems to offer a "but for" test which is generally considered a trouble-
some standard wherever used.
14
The emphasis of the Currens test, on the other hand, is placed upon
the determination of mental illness, and whether the accused has suffi-
cient mental control to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law. Many have feared that under such a rule, the jury's preoccupation
with establishing the mental illness and lack of substantial capacity
could detract from a consideration of the causal connection between the
mental illness and the act. Hence, the argument goes, the jury could
satisfy itself that the accused is substantially incapacitated by mental
illness, and since little attention would be given to the causal relation,
the habitual criminal, or psychopath would be granted an effective lever
which could result in the freeing of many enemies of society.15
This contention may be answered by reference to the policies under-
lying the need for an insanity standard. The basic goal of any test for
insanity is to separate those who are responsible for their acts from
those who are not. Consequently, the defendant's "habit of crime" should
not of itself defeat the possibility of declaring him insane. Rather, the
reason behind the habit should be investigated to determine whether it
is the result of mental illness. Those who criticize the acquittal of the
psychopath should instead turn their efforts to the development of ap-
propriate legislation whereby persons, adjudged insane at trial, are re-
quired to undergo psychiatric treatment in mental institutions. 16
Since 1899 and the decision of State v. Peel, 7 the M'Naghten-
irresistible impulse rule has been generally accepted as the controlling
"Ibid.
"Durham has been attacked for its failure to establish an adequate causal connection
between the illness and the act. See United States v. Currens, note 5 supra at 774.
This criticism is based primarily on the use of the word, "product," which is con-
sidered vague and subject to many interpretations. However, it is not believed that
the jury will labor with the theoretical meaning of this term. "Product of" should
simply be interpreted to mean '' cause of" or ''result of.''
"Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"PROSSER, TORTS § 44 at 220 (2d ed. 1955).
"Note, Criminal Law: Insanity: A New Test of Criminal Responsibility, 9 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 516, 518-19 (1962).
"eAlthough psychiatric treatment for all persons manifesting mental disorder would be
the ideal, it is recognized that inavailability of funds and trained personnel present
tremendous obstacles to such an undertaking. These problems are no doubt more
acute in Montana than in other states due to this state's sparse population. Never-
theless, the problems must be faced squarely in order to provide help for those with
mental disorder.
123 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169, 173 (1899).
[Vol. 25,
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criterion for the determination of insanity in Montana. However, the
road has not always been smooth. In State v. Keerl, 8 the court seriously
questioned the utility of a jury instruction under the rule, and stated
that the M'Naghten rule seemed irreconcilable with the concept of irre-
sistible impulse. Nevertheless, the court did not overrule the holding of
the Peel decision. This apparent contradiction in Keerl evidently has not
posed a difficult problem to the court, since the combined rule has been
applied in subsequent decisions. 19
The court in the instant case approved the combined rule, but at
the same time, recognized its shortcomings. Mr. Justice Harrison, writing
the majority opinion stated:
This court has never determined whether by the applica-
tion of the right-wrong test, insanity is determined, or whether
insanity must first be determined, and the right and wrong test
applied to measure the degree of insanity which renders a man
subject to "irresistible impulse."
Since the Peel case the court has labored with this two-
headed monster in vain to bring it into proper focus. 20
Every test of insanity is subject to criticism on some basis. This is no
doubt one reason most courts have adhered to the test previously estab-
lished in their jurisdiction. By so doing, emphasis could be placed on
articulating the adopted rule rather than continually searching for a new
standard, a procedure which seems justified in such a complex field of
law.
In the instant case one of the instructions included elements of both
the M'Naghten rule and irresistible impulse test. Another instruction,
although purporting to present the irresistible impulse standard, did not
use the words "irresistible impulse."'" Nevertheless, the court held that
the two instructions together reflected the true meaning of the rule. 22
If the concern of the court is to clarify the use of the adopted rule,
every instruction on insanity should be subjected to careful analysis on
appeal. The court should initially require the instruction to be concise.
Verbiage saps an instruction of any value which it may otherwise have.
The better instructions should rely on terms used in the rules although
cautious use of further instructions for purposes of emphasis or clarity
may be advisable. When a rule is paraphrased, it must properly reflect
the emphasis of the standard. Any major violation of these particulars
should constitute reversible error.
In the instant case, if the emphasis had been placed on examining
the defendant's total personality, he might have been acquitted. He was
obviously suffering from serious mental illness, having been diagnosed a
"129 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362, 365 (1904).
"State v. Crowe, 39 Mont. 174, 102 Pac. 579 (1909); State v. Colbert, 58 Mont. 584,
194 Pac. 145 (1920); State v. Narich, 92 Mont. 17, 9 P.2d 477 (1932); State v. Simp-
son, 109 Mont. 198, 95 P.2d 761 (1939).
,Instant case at 509.
1Id., at 508.
1Id., at 510.
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schizophrenic by at least four different psychiatrists over a ten year
period; shortly after his arrest, he was declared incompetent to stand
trial.2 3 A mere 43 days later he was considered able to properly defend
himself. As was pointed out in the dissent, it was highly improbable, if
not impossible, for him to have been cured by the short period of treat-
inent before trial. 24 If the jury had been clearly instructed to consider
the seriousness and long history of the defendant's illness, hopefully he
would now be undergoing psychiatric treatment designed to rehabilitate
him rather than serving a life sentence in the state prison.
It is submitted that the courts, as yet, have not met the challenge
of treating a complex problem in a simple and understandable fashion.
At the base of the problem are the difficult communication barriers that
exist between psychiatrists, attorneys, and lay jurors. Furthermore, many
proponents and critics of the tests have allowed their logic to be
clouded because of their less than unanimous accord on how to treat
persons once they have been adjudged insane. Until these difficulties
are overcome, no real development can take place in this field of the law.
DAVID NIKLAS.
GENERAL ADMONITIONS TO JURY NOT TO READ NEWSPAPER AccOUNTS
OF TRIAL HELD SUFFICIENT TO COUNTERACT ADVERSE PUBLICITY.-The de-
fendant was indicted in the District Court of Park County for first de-
gree burglary. A motion for change of venue was granted and the case
removed to the District Court of Yellowstone County, where the de-
fendant was convicted of the crime charged. Fifteen counts of error
were specified. Included therein were the denial of the defendant's chal-
lenge to a member of the jury panel for having formed an opinion as
to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and the denial of his motion
for a mistrial. The motion for mistrial was founded upon the alleged mis-
conduct of the prosecutor who, at such time as the case was ready for
submission to the jury, filed a charge against a third party for embracery
of a juror trying the defendant. The charge was headlined in the local
newspaper and broadcast over radio and television. Prior to his arrest,
the defendant had been the Chief of Police of Livingston, Montana. This
factor probably contributed to the widespread publicity which his arrest
and trial received. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held,
affirmed. There was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion
or that there was error prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Moran,
384 P.2d 777, (Mont. 1963). 1
21id., at 507.
2"Id., at 517.
'Because indictment by grand jury is rarely used in Montana, it is significant to note
that the defendant in the instant case was so indicted. The last time a reported Mon-
tana case dealt with a grand jury was in 1950, in the case of State ex rel. Porter v.
Dist. Ct., 124 Mont. 249, 220 P.2d 1035 (1950). This case contains an excellent dis-
cussion of the grand jury in respect to its history, purpose, and application.
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